Heuristics and Biases: Clinical versus Actuarial Judgment
By Robyn M. Dawes, David I Faust, P. Meehl. 2002
1,724 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: General Decision Sciences, Psychiatry and Mental health, Philosophy
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In General Decision Sciences
- Don A. Mooreb
- Julia A. Minsona
- Jennifer M. Logga
- Dale W. Griffin
- Daniel Memmert
- Cade Massey
- Sendhil Mullainathan
- Amos Tversky
In Psychiatry and Mental health
- Amos Tversky
- Don A. Mooreb
- Julia A. Minsona
- Jennifer M. Logga
- T. Scruggs
- Margo Mastropieri
- Dale W. Griffin
- David P. Farrington
In Philosophy
- Daniel G. Goldstein
- Donald R. Lehmann
- Dale W. Griffin
- L. Clark
- D. Watson
- Sendhil Mullainathan
- Amos Tversky
- Don A. Mooreb
Citations in the corpus
- Simple Rules for Complex Decisions (2017, background): “A large body of work shows that intuitive judgments are generally inferior to those based on statistical models [4, 5, 19, 20, 33].”
- Most items in structured risk assessment instruments do not predict violence (2011, background): “It is accepted that structured risk assessment instruments outperform clinical judgement in the accuracy of prediction of violent and sexual behaviour (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989 ; Grove & Meehl, 1996 ).”
- Programmatic assessment: From assessment of learning to assessment for learning (2011, background): “Unfortunately though, human judgement is often considered fallible, especially when compared to actuarial methods (Dawes et al. 1989).”
- Machine Learning: An Applied Econometric Approach (2017, background): “Even when an algorithm can help, we must understand the factors that determine adoption of these tools (Dawes, Faust, and Meehl 1989; Dietvorst, Simmons, and Massey 2015; Yeomans, Shah, Mullainathan, and Kleinberg 2016).”