Developmental origin of the animate-inanimate distinction.
By David H. Rakison, D. Poulin-Dubois. 2001
372 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cultural Studies, Developmental and Educational Psychology
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cultural Studies
- Marc H. Bornstein
- Paul C. Quinn
- H. Clark Barrett
- Samantha L. Nayer
- D. Poulin-Dubois
- Sarah Frenkiel-Fishman
- Susan C. Johnson
- Linda B. Smith
In Developmental and Educational Psychology
- Marc H. Bornstein
- Paul C. Quinn
- A. Woodward
- Martha E. Arterberry
- Matthias Schlesewsky
- Jose J. Guajardo
- Clay Mash
- Ina Bornkessel
Citations in the corpus
- THE DEVELOPMENT OF OBJECT CATEGORIZATION IN YOUNG CHILDREN: HIERARCHICAL INCLUSIVENESS, AGE, PERCEPTUAL ATTRIBUTE, AND GROUP VERSUS INDIVIDUAL ANALYSES (2010, background): “…guided by conceptual representations that initially are broad in scope (e.g., animates, inanimates; Gelman & Opfer, 2002; PoulinDubois, Frenkiel-Fishman, Nayer, & Johnson, 2006; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001), and these concepts become more differentiated over developmental time (Mandler, 2004).”
- Infant's Inductive Generalization of Bodily, Motion, and Sensory Properties to Animals and People (2006, background): “…these studies seem to provide rather compelling evidence that infants’ early categories are indeed conceptual categories, they nonetheless do not address the hypothesis that infants make use of motion cues to form animate and inanimate concepts (Mandler, 1992; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001).”
- Accurate judgments of intention from motion cues alone: A cross-cultural study (2005, background): “In recent years, the literature on perception of animate motion has grown enormously (for recent reviews, see Gelman & Opfer, 2002; Johnson, 2000; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000), including research on the specific cues that drive intention inferences and the development of…”
- Superstitious, magical, and paranormal beliefs: An integrative model (2007, background): “By the middle of the second year children understand that animate beings can reciprocate actions and have a capacity to move and initiate actions without external force (Carey & Spelke, 1994; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001; Wellman & Gelman, 1992).”
- Is agency skin-deep? Surface attributes influence infants' sensitivity to goal-directed action (2004, background): “As is the case for grammar, several kinds of cognitive processes seem likely to contribute to the construction of action knowledge, including statistical learning (Baldwin & Baird, 2001), associative learning (Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001), and structure mapping (Gentner & Medina , 1998).”
- Perceptual Features and the Development of Conceptual Knowledge (2006, background): “Indeed, Rakison and Poulin-Dubois (2001) suggested that Mandler and McDonough’s results could reflect children’s use of a single prominent feature, such as having a mouth or having eyes, that is predictive of entities that engage in the role of drinking.”
- Comparing a computer agent with a humanoid robot (2007, background): “Studies of animism show that certain kinds of movement automatically cause even babies to perceive an object as alive [15].”
- Experience-Based and On-Line Categorization of Objects in Early Infancy (2010, background): “Because the familiarization and test objects in this study had similar perceptual features, infants’ choice of object following familiarization likely reflects a perceptual match of the test object to the familiarization exemplars (Rakison, 2005; Rakison & Hahn, 2004; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001).”
- The extended argument dependency model: a neurocognitive approach to sentence comprehension across languages. (2006, background): “Not only is the distinc- tion between animate and inanimate entities central to crosslinguistic generalisations as described above, it is also important in general conceptual terms (Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001).”