Relational Contracts and the Value of Loyalty

By Simon Board. 2011

163 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2729bb5515191723f1c215562e3482cb2e6426ff

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. J. Marion
2. Ricard Gil

In Safety Research

1. J. Marion
2. Ricard Gil

Citations in the corpus

• Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational Contracting: Evidence from California Highway Procurement (2013, background): “Klein and Leffler (1981) were among the earliest contributors on this topic followed by others, such as Bull (1987), Klein and Murphy (1988), Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994), Klein (1996) and more recently Board (2008) and Halac (2008).”
• Management Practices, Relational Contracts, and the Decline of General Motors (2014, unknown): “…emerge in which more patient players form relational contracts while less patient players do not For example, in a model of supply relationships, Board (2011) finds that the optimal relational contract has an insider-outside form where some suppliers are “insiders” who are used routinely and…”