Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations

By William Fuchs. 2007

239 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bf0d158a92bdcb29a90cf2318aab123e20e83bc3

Citations in the corpus

• Feedback and Motivation in Dynamic Tournaments (2010, unknown): “The …rst term on the right-hand outside the brackets resembles the …rst term on the righthand side of equation ( 9 ) and captures the evaluation and risk reduction e¤ects.”
• The Value of Relationships: Evidence from a Supply Shock to Kenyan Rose Exports (2015, unknown): “Levin (2003) and Fuchs (2007), however, show that the optimal contract is a termination contract in which trade between parties continues in a stationary fashion provided performance is above a certain threshold during a certain period of time.”
• Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships (2012, unknown): “Levin (2003), MacLeod (2003) and Fuchs (2007) consider asymmetric information about the outcome variable.”
• Relational Contracts and Organizational Capabilities (2012, unknown): “…on how relational contracts can facilitate efficient behaviors, both on their own (e.g., Bull (1987), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), Levin (2003), Fuchs (2007), and Halac (2011)) and in combination with formal aspects of organizations and contracts (e.g., Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994, 1999,…”