Partial Gift Exchange in an Experimental Labor Market: Impact of Subject Population Differences, Productivity Differences, and Effort Requests on Behavior*

By R. Lynn, Hannan J Mack Robinson, John H. Kagel, Donald V. Moser. Journal of Labor Economics, 2002

247 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Information Systems and Management, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e8b251e47a0799f295d1b591ea8dad6d3f597be5

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Citations in the corpus

Individual versus group behavior and the role of the decision making procedure in gift-exchange experiments (2007, methodology): “Similar structures are used by Charness (2000) and Hannan et al. (2002) .”
A Behavioral Account of the Labor Market: The Role of Fairness Concerns (2008, background): “…the assumption of the existence of fair-minded individuals in infinitely repeated games is not needed to prove the existence of equilibria with noncompetitive wage rents.6 Even if all people are selfish, non-competitive rents can be equilibrium phenomena, provided that interactions are…”
Bonus versus Penalty: Does Contract Frame Affect Employee Effort? (2005, background): “Many studies in psychology (e.g., Goranson and Berkowitz 1966; Greenberg and Frisch 1972; Greenberg 1978) and experimental economics (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986; Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl 1993; Fehr, Gachter and Kirchsteiger 1997; Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold and Gachter 1998; Charness ”
Managers’ Green Investment Disclosures and Investors’ Reaction (2016, unknown): “shows that in incomplete contract environments, employers often offer a “gift” of a wage greater than the market-clearing level and workers reciprocate with a “gift” of greater effort than the minimum enforceable amount (Akerlof 1982; Fehr et al. 1993, 1997; Hannan et al. 2002; Hannan 2005; Kuang an”
Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students (2004, unknown): “reminiscent of the Hannan et al. (2002) result that MBA students”
Promises and Partnership (2006, unknown): “Hannan , Kagel , and Moser ( 2002 ) and Charness and Rabin ( 2005 ) consider the impact of requests or expressed hopes on responder behavior , but do not elicit beliefs or consider guilt aversion .”