Cross-VM side channels and their use to extract private keys
By Yinqian Zhang, Ari Juels, Michael K. Reiter, Thomas Ristenpart. Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2012
895 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Signal Processing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e6893fb55e26ab59ab878268d01c02a13d99a526
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Daniel Gruss
- Yuval Yarom
- Stefan Mangard
- Marcus Peinado
- Thomas Eisenbarth
- Gorka Irazoqui Apecechea
- Michael Schwarz
- Clémentine Maurice
In Signal Processing
- Daniel Gruss
- Yuval Yarom
- Stefan Mangard
- Marcus Peinado
- Michael Schwarz
- Thomas Eisenbarth
- Gorka Irazoqui Apecechea
- Weidong Cui
Citations in the corpus
- Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems (2015, background): “Cache side-channel attacks [47], [12], [40], [7], [8], [14], [46], [44], [52] are most closely related to the attacks described in this paper, as both exploit”
- An analysis of security issues for cloud computing (2013, background): “Unlike physical servers, VMs have two boundaries: physical and virtual [24] .”
- Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing (2016, background): “Further, the attack recovered 66% of the private key bits by running the decryption only once, unlike existing cachetiming attacks, which usually demand several hundreds to several tens of thousands of iterations [20, 35, 65].”
- CacheBleed: a timing attack on OpenSSL constant-time RSA (2016, background): “Persistent-state channels have targeted the L1 data cache [9,17,45,46], the L1 instruction cache [1,5,56], the branch prediction buffer [3,4], the last-level cache [31,33,40,51,54], and DRAM open rows [47].”
- Cross-Tenant Side-Channel Attacks in PaaS Clouds (2014, background): “, [28, 30, 25, 34, 40]), Flush-Reload attacks involve relatively less noise, since the adversary is able to”
- DRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU Attacks (2015, background): “to be effective in a multitude of settings, such as crossVM key-recovery attacks [9, 12, 20, 30], including attacks across cores [5, 14, 16, 28].”
- S$A: A Shared Cache Attack That Works across Cores and Defies VM Sandboxing -- and Its Application to AES (2015, methodology): “– Huge pages: The scenario is different if we work with huge size pages.”
- CacheAudit: A Tool for the Static Analysis of Cache Side Channels (2013, methodology): “In case studies, we apply CacheAudit to binary executables of algorithms for sorting and encryption, including the AES implementation from the PolarSSL library, and the reference implementations of the .nalists of the eSTREAM stream cipher competition.”
- Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical (2015, methodology): “Conventionally, for the L1 caches, the PRIME+ PROBE technique primes and probes the entire L1 cache, and uses machine-learning techniques to analyze the cache footprint in order to identify spatial patterns associated with the victim’s memory activity [4, 8, 31, 47].”
- CQSTR: Securing Cross-Tenant Applications with Cloud Containers (2016, background): “We therefore consider threats such as insider attacks by IaaS employees, cross-VM isolation boundary violations [39, 45, 55, 57, 60], or compromise of the IaaS control plane (e.”
- Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution (2018, background): “Recent results include cross-core and cross-CPU attacks [37, 75], cloud-based attacks [32, 76], attacks on and from trusted execution environments [10, 44, 61], attacks from mobile code [23, 46, 51], and new attack techniques [11, 28, 44].”
- SgxPectre Attacks: Leaking Enclave Secrets via Speculative Execution (2018, background): “iming difference between cache hits and cache misses to infer the victim’s memoryaccesspatterns. TypicalexamplesofcachesidechannelattacksarePRIME-PROBE andFLUSH-RELOAD attacks. In PRIME-PROBE attacks [54, 53, 84, 51, 7, 68, 46, 36], by pre-loading cache lines in a cache set, the adversary expects th”
- FLUSH+RELOAD: A High Resolution, Low Noise, L3 Cache Side-Channel Attack (2014, background): “Using a cache side-channel to trace the execution of a program is not a new idea [1, 2, 4, 14, 19, 29, 61].”
- AttriGuard: A Practical Defense Against Attribute Inference Attacks via Adversarial Machine Learning (2018, background): “A number of recent studies [1–11, 29–32] have demonstrated that users are vulnerable to attribute inference attacks.”
- Wait a Minute! A fast, Cross-VM Attack on AES (2014, background): “ElGamal keys in [34]) from a co-located VM.”