SgxPectre Attacks: Leaking Enclave Secrets via Speculative Execution

By Guoxing Chen, Sanchuan Chen, Yuan Xiao, Yinqian Zhang, Zhiqiang Lin, Ten-Hwang Lai. 2018

138 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Slalom: Fast, Verifiable and Private Execution of Neural Networks in Trusted Hardware (2018, background): “The recent Spectre attacks on speculative execution (Kocher et al., 2018) also prove damaging to SGX (as well as to most other processors), as recently shown (Chen et al., 2018; Dall et al., 2018; Van Bulck et al., 2018).”
Foreshadow: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order Execution (2018, unknown): “…in contrast to all previously published SGX side-channel attacks [17,39,45,51,57,58,60] and existing Spectre-style speculative execution attacks [7,49] against SGX enclaves, Foreshadow does not require any side-channel vulnerabilities, code gadgets, or even knowledge of the victim enclave’s…”
YerbaBuena: Securing Deep Learning Inference Data via Enclave-based Ternary Model Partitioning (2018, unknown): “, Foreshadow[52] and SGXPectre[6], and the”
RIDL: Rogue In-Flight Data Load (2019, unknown): “The result is a plethora of new attacks and attack vectors [1], [2], [3], [75], [5], [70], [4], [71].”
This Paper Is Included in the Proceedings of the 12th Usenix Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (osdi '16). Ryoan: a Distributed Sandbox for Untrusted Computation on Secret Data Ryoan: a Distributed Sandbox for Untrusted Computation on Secret Data (unknown): “There have been successful Spectre attacks that violate SGX isolation, allowing non-enclave code to read enclave memory [15, 71].”
Low Latency Privacy Preserving Inference (2018, methodology): “Other techniques, such as MPC and SGX make additional assumptions and therefore provide weaker protection to the data (Yao, 1982; McKeen et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2018; Koruyeh et al., 2018).”
Context-Sensitive Fencing: Securing Speculative Execution via Microcode Customization (2019, methodology): “These include SgxPectre [14] that bypasses Intel’s SGX [41] security mechanisms to steal secrets from SGX enclaves, the MeltdownPrime/SpectrePrime [70] that leverage a PRIME+PROBE [55] cache attack instead of FLUSH+RELOAD [82] by exploiting the side effects of cache line invalidation mechanisms in m”
A Systematic Evaluation of Transient Execution Attacks and Defenses (2018, background): “To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to recognize that Spectre-BTB mistraining can also proceed by repeatedly executing the vulnerable indirect branch with valid inputs.”