Quality leadership when regulatory standards are forthcoming
By Stefan Lutz, Thomas P. Lyon, John W. Maxwell. 2003
217 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e201fb5ae4d1fb7ca426ba097e908cab2187edb1
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Edward S. Rubin
- Jaegul Lee
- Francisco Veloso
- David A. Hounshell
- George Deltas
- D. E. Sappington
- Madhu Khanna
- Steven L. Puller
In Strategy and Management
- George Deltas
- Jaegul Lee
- Francisco Veloso
- David A. Hounshell
- D. R. Harrington
- D. E. Sappington
- Madhu Khanna
- Steven L. Puller
Citations in the corpus
- Adoption of Pollution Prevention Techniques: The Role of Management Systems and Regulatory Pressures (2009, background): “However, these studies ignore the potential for firms to influence the stringency with which regulations are enforced, to preempt or influence future regulations (as Segerson and Miceli 1998; Lutz et al. 2000) or to indirectly lower costs of compliance through synergistic reductions in related pollu”
- Optimal Tax Policy under Environmental Quality Competition (2005, background): “However, if the minimum quality standard is anticipated, social welfare decreases with the standard ( Lutz et al. 2000 ).”
- Regulating Service Quality: A Survey (2005, background): “Constantatos and Perrakis (1998) and Lutz et al. (2000) demonstrate that the welfare effects of an MQS can vary with the timing of quality and entry decisions and with the sequencing of the choice of standards and quality levels.”
- Market Effects of Changes in Consumers' Social Responsibility (2009, unknown): “overview with special emphasis on the existing empirical findings and Lutz et al. (2000) who use a fairly”
- Forcing technological change: A case of automobile emissions control technology development in the US (2010, background): “Poor credibility of a regulatory agency as far as enforcing the standards are concerned may encourage firms to behave strategically, such as by influencing the regulator to be less strict in the enforcement of the standards or to encourage it to delay enforcement (Lutz et al., 2000; Puller, 2006).”
- The strategic use of innovation to influence regulatory standards (2006, background): “[20] study the role of a firm’s first-mover advantage in a strategic game between firms and a regulator to set quality standards.”