The informational value of sequential fundraising

By Lise Vesterlund. 2003

485 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e14a35c62f60cc23ed6f39a0519947e96e04f930

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Citations in the corpus

Crowding Out and Crowding In of Private Donations and Government Grants (2014, background): “…in may occur if grants provide a positive signal of charity quality.2 A signaling model of contributions to charities is presented in Payne (2001), Vesterlund (2003), and Andreoni (2006), where ‘‘seed money’’ from large donors or announcements of previous donations increase others’ donations by…”
Anonymity in Giving in a Natural Context : A Field Experiment in 30 Churches (2005, background): “Vesterlund (2003) provides a theoretical model on sequential fundraising showing that announcement of contributions can be optimal when there is imperfect information about the value of the good.”
An Empirical Examination of the Antecedents and Consequences of Contribution Patterns in Crowd-Funded Markets (2013, unknown): “The efforts of Andreoni (1998), Vesterlund (2003) and Varian (1994) are rare exceptions to this as these authors consider contribution sequencing.”
Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments (2007, background): “If well-known persons donate to a certain project and this is publicly announced, others often tend to follow (Vesterlund, 2003).1 A similar effect arises when at the start of a public fundraising campaign a notable fraction of the goal is pledged as seed money (List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002).”
After You - Endogenous Sequencing in Voluntary Contribution Games (2005, background): “One reason why the uninformed is more likely to play best response may be that subjects are more familiar with situations where they benefit from concealing their actions while observing those of others.”
Conditional cooperation: Behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications (2006, background): “, Andreoni and Petrie 2004; Soetevent 2005), or because observing others has informational value about the charity (Romano and Yildirim 2001; Vesterlund 2003).”
An Experimental Test of the Crowding Out Hypothesis (2005, methodology): “This bendorsement effectQ may be due to perceived superior information on the part of the third-party giver, as analyzed in Vesterlund (2003).”
Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study (2007, background): “The dynamics of our model is similar to that of Hermalin (1998) and Vesterlund (2003).3 Using perfectly revealing signals these models focus on the gain achieved from revealing the signal to the follower (i.e., securing contributions when m = 1.5).”
Toward an Understanding of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field Experiment (2006, unknown): “As discussed in Vesterlund (2003), a charity can possibly gain credibility and/or reveal the type and value of the public good by announcing “seed money” contributions that it has already received prior to eliciting contributions from the public at large.6 To reflect the informational value of…”
Leadership and the voluntary provision of public goods: Field evidence from Bolivia (2015, background): “Substantial theoretical and experimental literature has shown that first movers can affect voluntary contributions in sequential decision settings through free-riding (Varian, 1994), information signaling (Hermalin, 1998, 2007; Vesterlund, 2003; Potters et al., 2005, 2007; Andreoni, 2006), reciproci”
A Field Experiment in Charitable Contribution: The Impact of Social Information on the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods (2009, unknown): “An additional model, Vesterlund (2003) posits that donors use others contributions as a signal of the charity’s quality.”
Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing "Conditional Cooperation" in a Field Experiment (2004, background): “…M. Messick, 1999); second, people have some level of fairness preferences, such as reciprocity (Matthew Rabin, 1993); or third, contributions by others may serve as a signal of the quality of the public good, or of the organization that provides the good (e.g., a charity) (Lise Vesterlund, 2003).”