After You - Endogenous Sequencing in Voluntary Contribution Games

By Jan Potters, Martin Sefton, Lise Vesterlund. 2005

252 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bde42764264d9c79f826e409fa099ac3d3c45ea7

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Citations in the corpus

The Effect of Status on Charitable Giving (2010, methodology): “16The voluntary contribution game mirrors that of Potters, Sefton, and Vesterlund (2005, 2007) when m = 0.75.”
Anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity: Evidence from voluntary contributions to a national park in Costa Rica (2008, background): “Potters et al. (2005) find that sequential moves in a public good game results in a larger provision of the good, because the follower mimics the action of the leader.”
Leadership and the voluntary provision of public goods: Field evidence from Bolivia (2015, background): “Potters et al. (2005, 2007) provide laboratory evidence supporting these results.”
Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments (2007, background): “Recently, Potters et al. (2005) have shown in a setting with asymmetric information that pairs of one leader and one follower are remarkably often successful in the endogenous sequencing of contributions.”
The Market for Charitable Giving (2011, result): “prices and incomes,7 they report relevant permanent and temporary elasticities in stark contrast to those of Randolph. Most importantly, they find results that suggest the permanent price elasticity exceeds the "gold standard" of —1. Related research due to Tiehan (2001),Joulfaian (2000), and O'Neil”
Gift giving: An interdisciplinary review (2007, background): “Potters et al. (2005) also found that where the order of contributions is set exogenously by a third party, such as a fundraiser, announcing initial contributions (i.e., the seed money) helps to maximize the level of contributions, rather than allowing donors to set the sequence of moves themselves.”
Leadership giving in charitable fund-raising (2006, background): “Potters, Sefton, and Vesterlund (2001, 2005) confirm the implications of this theory experiments on sequential giving.”
Hey Look at Me: The Effect of Giving Circles on Giving (2014, unknown): “Evidence from Potters et al. (2005) suggests that sequential giving does not increase donations in public goods game when the quality of the public good is commonly known.”
Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study (2007, background): “11 Part of the data from the asymmetric-information condition is also presented in Potters et al. (2005).”
Simultaneous and Sequential Contributions to Step-level Public Goods (2015, unknown): “The experimental literature on these issues (which we review in detail subsequently) includes Erev and Rapoport (1990); Potters, Sefton, and Vesterlund (2005); Gächter et al. (2010a, 2010b); and Figuieres, Masclet, and Willinger (2011).”