Bankers on boards:: monitoring, conflicts of interest, and lender liability☆

By Randall S. Kroszner, Philip E. Strahan. 2001

255 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e035c8c8a86412a77028db992e5e97f87783b1ab

Citations in the corpus

• Bankers on the Boards of German Firms: What They Do, What They are Worth, and Why They are (Still) There (2010, unknown): “10 See Kroszner and Strahan (2001), referring to the Forbes 500 firms in 1992.”
• Connected Lending: Thailand before the Financial Crisis (2006, unknown): “We define the board connections in a similar manner to Kroszner and Strahan (2001a).”
• Do the Type and Number of Blockholders Influence R&D Investments? New evidence from Spain (2007, unknown): “First, banks maintain business relationships with the firm in which they invest beyond simple ownership, often in the form of loans and credits (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001).”
• The Determinants of Board Structure (2008, unknown): “from those in the Lehn et al. (2004) and Boone et al.”
• Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value (2009, unknown): “For example, Kroszner and Strahan (2001) and Guner et al. (2008) focus on boards with directors that have banking experience.”
• Political Connectedness and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany (2010, unknown): “Our results offer a first indication that this also seems to be the case in Germany.4 Second, our paper is also related to the literature on the impact of characteristics of corporate board members on firm performance (see, e.g., Güner et al., 2008; Kroszner and Strahan, 2001).”
• Universal Banks and Corporate Control: Evidence from the Global Syndicated Loan Market (2012, unknown): “Like Kroszner and Strahan (2001a), we find that banks have a higher”
• Which Governance Mechanisms Promote Efficiency in Reaching Poor Clients? Evidence from Rated Microfinance Institutions (2012, unknown): “In the USA, bankers are rarely represented on boards of firms, because shareholder–creditor conflicts have been relatively unimportant (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001).”