Connected Lending: Thailand before the Financial Crisis

By Chutatong Charumilind, Raja Kali, Yupana Wiwattanakantang. 2006

284 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/584e469b3263ad5d759d8a7c8a46f5f505b66483

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In Accounting

1. Walid Saffar
2. Yishay Yafeh
3. Narjess Boubakri
4. Lloyd Steier
5. J. Cosset
6. Tarun Khanna
7. K. Wei
8. Junghee Park

In Finance

1. Walid Saffar
2. Yishay Yafeh
3. Tarun Khanna
4. Narjess Boubakri
5. J. Cosset
6. Lloyd Steier
7. K. Wei
8. Junghee Park

Citations in the corpus

• Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites? (2007, background): “23 More recent evidence in Cheung et al. (2006), who document tunneling in Hong Kong (often through “connected transactions” between related parties), suggests that tunneling is not especially common in pyramidal groups.”
• Why Do Firms Form New Banking Relationships (2011, unknown): “, Petersen and Rajan (1994), Cole (1998)), lower collateral requirements (e.”
• Board Size, Independence and Performance: An Analysis of Thai Banks (2007, unknown): “Prior to the crisis in 1996, the Thai financial system consisted of 15 local banks, 14 foreign bank branches, 91 finance companies, 12 credit finance companies, 15 insurance companies, 880 private provident funds, 8 mutualfund management companies and seven specialized state-owned financial institut”
• Corporate finance and governance in emerging markets: A selective review and an agenda for future research (2011, background): “…that firm owners and managers may bribe or build connections with bureaucrats who can influence state banks to give loans and other business privileges to these firms (e.g., Sapienza, 2004; Dinc, 2005; Khawaja and Mian, 2005; Charumilind et al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2008).”
• Big Business Owners in Politics (2009, unknown): “The estimated coe¢ cient on the variable of interest, the interaction variable TCL*AFTER, is not statisti- 9See, for example, Johnson and Mitton (2003), Khwaja and Mian (2005), Charumilind, Kali, and Wiwattanakantang (2006), and Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006).”
• Political connections of newly privatized firms (2008, background): “Charumilind et al. (2006) study connected lending in Thailand before the financial crisis.”
• Political Connections and Industrial Pollution: Evidence Based on State Ownership and Environmental Levies in China (2016, background): “In particular, they often enjoy favorable policies that reduce competition (Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang 2009), allow better access to capital and better terms from bank lending (Johnson and Mitton 2003; Cull and Xu 2005; Charumilind et al. 2006), offer a greater chance of being bailed out whe”
• Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms (2014, unknown): “There may be hardly any upside for politically connected firms to appoint Big Four auditors to enhance accounting transparency since extensive prior research supports that they have access to cheap loans from state-owned banks anyway (e.g., Dinç, 2005; Wiwattanakantang et al., 2006; and Claessens et”