The Determinants of Board Structure

By James S. Linck, Jeffry M. Netter, Tina Yang. 2008

1,833 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a25ffab6c368ae625dc0fb1cade13ff27a92b1cf

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Collins G. Ntim
2. Christopher S. Armstrong
3. W. Guay
4. Bert D’Espallier
5. Rodrigo S. Verdi
6. Ronald W. Masulis
7. Paul M. Guest
8. Iftekhar Hasan

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Bert D’Espallier
2. Paul M. Guest
3. Todd A. Gormley
4. David A. Matsa
5. Sabur Mollah
6. A. Boateng
7. M. Babajide Wintoki
8. Ronald W. Masulis

In Finance

1. Rodrigo S. Verdi
2. Paul M. Guest
3. Christopher S. Armstrong
4. Shams Pathan
5. M. Skully
6. W. Guay
7. Sabur Mollah
8. Hamid Mehran

Citations in the corpus

• Investor Perceptions of Financial Misconduct: The Heterogeneous Contamination of Bystander Firms (2015, methodology): “As already noted, the requirements of SOX put more emphasis on the accountability of the CEO and of the independent directors on the board (e.g., Linck et al., 2008).”
• CEO Compensation, Family Control and Institutional Investors in Continental Europe (2012, methodology): “…CEO characteristics, we control for CEO age (CEO AGE), which can either be a proxy for managerial entrenchment, experience with positive implications for firm performance, or a proxy for the length of time to retirement (Gibbons and Murphy, 1993; Linck et al., 2008; Fernandes et al., 2012).”
• Complexity of financial reporting standards and accounting expertise (2019, positive): “In terms of control variables, we first include proxies for firm complexity used in the prior literature (e.g., Doyle et al., 2007b; Erkens and Bonner, 2013; Linck et al., 2008): firm size (Size), number of operating and geographic segments (NumBus and NumGeo), indicator for foreign sales (Foreign),”
• Compensation committee governance quality, chief executive officer stock option grants, and future firm performance (2009, background): “We include GROW because several studies find that board independence is negatively associated with growth opportunities (e.g., Bathala and Rao 1995, Lehn et al. 2003, Linck et al. 2005).”
• Corporate Boards and Regulation: The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Exchange Listing Requirements on Firm Value (2007, positive): “Mulherin (2005), Raheja (2005), Boone et al. (2006), Coles et al. (2006), Linck et al. (2006a) ) suggests that boards are endogenously determined based on a firm’s individual characteristics and operating environment.”