Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity: Comment

By L. Marx, Greg Shaffer. 2004

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Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO (2004, unknown): “In stage 2, each foreign government simultaneously decides whether to accept or reject, holding bpassive beliefsQ about the offer faced by the other foreign government (McAfee and Schwartz, 1994).”
The Strategic Positioning of Store Brands in Retailer–Manufacturer Negotiations (2004, background): “Nash Bargaining) and with the contract equilibrium concept of Cremer and Riordan (1987) and O’Brien and Shaffer (1992), and the pairwise-proof equilibrium in McAfee and Schwartz (1994) .”
Games played through agents (2003, background): “See McAfee and Schwartz [10] for a discussion and further references.”
Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities (2003, background): “The game in which the principal makes simultaneous offers to the agents, which we refer to as the offer game, has been studied, for example, by Hart and Tirole (1990), McAfee and Schwartz (1994) , Rey and Tirole (1996), and Segal (1999).”