Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities

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Multiple-Bank Lending, Creditor Rights and Information Sharing (2009, unknown): “Segal and Whinston (2003) and Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) consider a more general contracting space by introducing latent contracts and menus.”
Endogenous games and mechanisms: Side payments among players (2005, background): “Segal and Whinston (2003) also provide insight into how allowing for rich contracts can matter by changing the information revealed in the context of contracting between a principal and multiple agents.”
Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria (2003, unknown): “In (2)Segal and Whinston (2001) analyze a related model where bargaining power may be more evenly distributed.”
The Welfare Effects of Bundling in Multichannel Television Markets (2012, background): “Horn and Wolinsky (1988), McAfee and Schwartz (1994), and Segal and Whinston (2003) study these environments whenone side of the market has one or two agents.”
Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition (2004, background): “11 Our non-cooperative bargaining game is an extension of the extensive form game underlying the wage bargaining model of Stole and Zwiebel (1996)—hereafter SZ – to the case of vertical supply agreements.”
Competitive effects of vertical integration (2005, background): “What are lacking from the general theory are robust predictions across a set of plausible beliefs (Segal and Whinston, 2003).”