Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
By Haluk Ergin. 2002
312 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/db9baf9cb9f9b6bc8a9ef27a6020e5bb1e0244a4
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Onur Kesten
- M. Utku Ünver
- Tayfun Sönmez
- Aytek Erdil
- Julien Grenet
- Gabrielle Fack
- YingHua He
- Haluk Ergin
Citations in the corpus
- What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice (2008, background): “On the other hand, in the school choice model, schools See Abdulkadirog˘lu, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth (2005, 2008), Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2005, 2006), Ergin (2002), Ergin and Sönmez (2006), and Onur Kesten (2005, 2006).”
- Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism (2006, background): “The signiÞcance of matchings μ3 and μ4 is that they constitute the set of stable matchings under true preferences.(8) (8)The matching μ1 is blocked by the student-school pair (i3, b), the matching μ2 is blocked by the student-school pair (i2, a), the matching μ5 is blocked by the student-school pair”
- A theory of school‐choice lotteries (2015, background): “This finding can also be interpreted as the random analogue of the mechanism proposed by Erdil and Ergin (2008) for a deterministic school-choice model with random tie-breaking.”
- Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources (2009, unknown): “The links between the two models were later discovered and explored by Balinski and Sönmez (1999), Ergin (2002), Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003a), Ehlers and Klaus (2006), and Kojima and Manea (2007), among others.”
- Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions (2019, methodology): “To prove parts (ii) and (iii), we can use the proof of Theorem 6.3 in Haeringer and Klijn (2009) and, therefore, that of Theorem 1 in Ergin (2002).”
- Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* (2013, unknown): “See, for instance, Costa and Kahn (2000) for a description of the trends in the labor market choices for college-educated couples since World War II.”