Risk Management, Corporate Governance, and Bank Performance in the Financial Crisis

By Vincent Aebi, G. Sabato, Markus Schmid. 2012

1,043 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d9c2e03f19adf40ce5099bae0c7d033dff190086

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Citations in the corpus

Risk management and firm value: recent theory and evidence (2016, background): “However, Aebi et al. (2012) study 573 US financial institutions during the financial crisis, finding that standard corporate governance variables are unrelated to performance (stock returns and return on equity (ROE)) during this period.”
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS: A SURVEY (2016, neutral): “Although it is not the main focus of their paper, also Aebi et al. (2012) find that board size is positively related to their indicators of 372 US banks’ performance (i.e., buy-and-hold returns and ROE) measured over the tim period July 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008.”
Exploring the Nexus Between Human Capital, Corporate Governance and Performance: Evidence from Islamic Banks (2017, neutral): “This aspect has garnered substantial attention, particularly following the financial crisis (Aebi et al., 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013; Wintoki et al., 2012).”
Ownership Structure and Risk-Taking: Comparative Evidence from Private and State-Controlled Banks in China (2014, methodology): “Finally, consistent with Aebi et al. (2012), we also find that the presence of the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) on the executive team, and a greater number of female directors, significantly reduce risk taking.”
The Impact of Enterprise Risk Management on the Marginal Cost of Reducing Risk: Evidence from the Insurance Industry (2014, neutral): “Aebi et al. (2012) investigate whether risk management-related corporate governance mechanisms at the end of the year 2006 are associated with better bank performance during the financial crisis of 2007–2008.”
Contagion and Banking Crisis - International Evidence for 2007-2009 (2015, methodology): “Potential multicollinearity between bank capital and non-performing loan and credit growth motivate the different control variables used in these two specifications (Aebi et al., 2012; Bruyckere et al., 2013; Shrieves and Dahl, 1992).”
Financial Expertise of the Board, Risk Taking, and Performance: Evidence from Bank Holding Companies (2014, neutral): “These results are confirmed by Aebi et al. (2012), who examine the impact of board-level risk management on bank performance during the 2007–2008 financial crisis.”
The performance effects of gender diversity on bank boards (2018, neutral): “…as also confirmed by the majority of the previous literature (Pi and Timme, 1993; de Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn, 2011; Aebi et al, 2012; Adams and Mehran, 2012).10 As an additional check, we address the possibility that banks’ reported Share of Independent Directors…”
Shari’ah supervision, corporate governance and performance : conventional vs. Islamic banks (2015, background): “These findings are generally consistent with Adams and Mehran (2012), Aebi et al. (2012), Francis et al. (2012) and Sierra et al. (2006).”
Corporate governance and performance of financial institutions (2015, background): “For example, see Beltratti and Stulz (2012), Erkens et al. (2012), Peni and Vähämaa (2012), Aebi et al. (2012), Fortin et al. (2010), and Cornett et al. (2009).”
Board diversity and financial fragility: Evidence from European banks (2017, background): “We argue that larger banks tend to have larger boards and are expected to have more diverse boards (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Aebi et al., 2012).”
The governance, risk-taking, and performance of Islamic banks (2016, neutral): “The studies by Sierra et al. (2006), Anders and Valledado (2008), Adams and Mehran (2012), Aebi et al. (2012), Francis et al. (2012), Wintoki et al. (2012), and Pathan and Faff (2013) investigate the governance mechanism and its effect on firms’ performance and value.”