Mutual Fund Advisory Contracts: An Empirical Investigation

By D. Deli. 2002

171 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d94e7d881a9fced0990b3bc03094f617603cc001

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Citations in the corpus

Yet Another Puzzle? The Relation between Price and Performance in the Mutual Fund Industry (2007, unknown): “20Different aspects of mutual fund fee determination have been studied, among others by Ferris and Chance (1987), Tufano and Sevick (1997), Latzko (1999), Malhotra and McLeod (1997), Luo (2002), Deli (2002), and Golec (2003).”
Incentive Compensation when Executives can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section (2003, background): “However, there is little empirical evidence of RPE, either in the explicit design of compensation contracts (see Coles, Suay, and Woodbury (2000) and Deli (2002)), or in the estimated relationship between compensation and market movements (see for example, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a), Antle and…”
Portfolio Manager Compensation in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry (2019, unknown): “In the majority cases, the advisory fee is specified as a percentage of the fund's total net assets (e.g., Deli (2002)).”
Incentives and Mutual Fund Performance: Higher Performance or Just Higher Risk Taking? (2009, unknown): “We use information on the fund advisory contract, and we build on the literature that has studied advisory compensation and used it as a proxy for actual incentives received by fund managers (Coles, Suay, and Woodbury, 2000; Deli, 2002; Deli and Varma, 2002; Kuhnen, 2004; and Warner and Wu, 2004).”
Managerial Incentives and Risk-taking (2006, unknown): “Guay (1999), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), Coles et al. (2000), Deli (2002) , and others.”
Mutual Funds and Bubbles: The Surprising Role of Contractual Incentives (2008, unknown): “, Deli (2002); Deli and Varma (2002); Kuhnen (2004); Warner and Wu (2004)] by using the compensation specified in these contractual arrangements as a proxy for the actual incentives received by the fund manager.”