Distracted Directors: Does Board Busyness Hurt Shareholder Value?

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Female board directorship and firm performance: What really matters? (2018, background): “…the exchange of vital inormation for firms ( Connelly and Van Slyke, 2012 ), are more ikely to understand the business environment of the company Hillman et al., 2007 ), and are more likely to have uncommon kills and strong abilities in both monitoring and advising mangers ( Falato et al., 2014 ).”
Shareholder Litigation Rights and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Derivative Lawsuits (2018, unknown): “3 Directors' busyness is detrimental to boardmonitoring quality and shareholder value (Shivdasani andYermack, 1999; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Falato et al., 2014).”
Monitoring the Monitor: Distracted Institutional Investors and Board Governance (2020, background): “Busy directors, defined as those with 3 or more total directorships during the year, are likely to be overcommitted and tend to be less effective monitors (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Lel, 2014; Masulis and Mobbs, 2014).”