Inherited Control and Firm Performance

By Francisco Pérez-González. 2006

1,194 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d655e56da784c3bd9536e1c9102b131615c5c133

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Citations in the corpus

Stewardship or Agency? A Social Embeddedness Reconciliation of Conduct and Performance in Public Family Businesses (2011, background): “That could lead to utility maximization behaviour (Miller et al., 2007; Pérez-González, 2006).”
Family Control of Firms and Industries (2010, neutral): “Family firm CEOs are classified as founders, descendants, or nonfamily members.”
CEO Compensation, Family Control and Institutional Investors in Continental Europe (2012, positive): “Families, as large shareholders, value control and are often involved in company management, even if this may lead to poor firm performance (Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007).”
Gender preferences in the CEO successions of family firms: Family characteristics and human capital of the successor (2015, background): “The literature on family firms and firm performance highlights a relationship between imperfections in CEO succession labor market contests and subsequent declines in the performance of firms that continue operations (Bennedsen, Nielsen, PérezGonzález, & Wolfenzon, 2007; Pérez-González, 2006).”
Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations (2007, positive): “…after ownership is handed over to the second generation of the family – the so-called succession problem (see, for example, Bennedsen et al. 2006; and Pérez-González, 2006), but there is mixed evidence on the performance of family-owned firms in general (see, for example, Morck et al. 1988; and…”
Shock-Based Causal Inference in Corporate Finance and Accounting Research (2015, methodology): “54Rauh (2006) and Low (2009) are the only “true DiDiD” papers in our sample and use a sensible third difference (existence of a staggered board).”
Executive Extraversion: Career and Firm Outcomes (2018, positive): “Following Perez-Gonzalez (2006), we adjust each firm outcome measure by subtracting the median Y from a control group of firms that are matched by industry and Y.”
Economic and Technological Importance of Innovations in Large Family and Founder Firms (2013, background): “In particular, family-managed firms are subject to nepotism, entrenchment, and a dearth of CEO talent that limits the human capital available to administer complex innovations (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007; Pérez-González, 2006).”