Family Control of Firms and Industries

By Belén Villalonga, Raphael Amit. 2010

339 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9dc7334530da5a82d35625d83fc1e9a7ded2e8c4

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Citations in the corpus

The Adolescence of Family Firm Research (2012, neutral): “Propping may be motivated by a desire to keep afloat a firm to which controlling family shareholders have an emotional attachment or for other noneconomic reasons such as the feelings of obligation one family member has to come to the aid of another at a time of need (Villalonga & Amit, 2010).”
Family Firm Research – A Review (2014, neutral): “Some studies show that founders create value and descendants destroy value (Villalonga and Amit, 2010).”
To Merge, Sell, or Liquidate? Socioemotional Wealth, Family Control, and the Choice of Business Exit (2019, positive): “Villalonga and Amit (2010) further observe that owner families often choose to use private funds to support their financially troubled firm even when its future prospects look dim (see also Minichilli, Brogi, & Calabrò, 2015; Salvato, Chirico, & Sharma, 2010).”
Does “Good” Corporate Governance Help in a Crisis? The Impact of Country‐ and Firm‐Level Governance Mechanisms in the European Financial Crisis (2013, background): “…in the performance of family versus other types of firms in the steady-state (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007), family shareholders’ longer investment horizons and their willingness to prop up firms in adversity (Villalonga & Amit, 2010) are likely to help in weathering a crisis.”
The economics of COVID-19: initial empirical evidence on how family firms in five European countries cope with the corona crisis (2020, result): “This is in line with prior literature proposing that, even during crisis situations, family firms benefit from their controlling families’ financial support to secure investments and employment in the case of reduced market demand and competitiveness (Villalonga and Amit, 2010).”
What do we know about Private Family Firms? A Meta–Analytical Review (2015, background): “Other scholars emphasize advantages arising from the parsimonious use of assets (Carney, 2005) and from organizational social capital (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007), which support firm longevity (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005) and resilience to economic shocks (Villalonga & Amit, 2010).”
Corporate divestitures and family control (2016, methodology): “The prevalence of family firms in both the American and global economies (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999; Villalonga and Amit, 2010) could explain this pair of stylized facts, in that this study has established that it is family firms, rather than their…”