Beyond Empathy. Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity

By D. Zahavi. 2010

310 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Drawing on the work of Scheler, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Sartre, this article presents an overview of some of the diverse approaches to intersubjectivity that can be found in the phenomenological tradition. Starting with a brief description of Scheler’s criticism of the argument from analogy, the article continues by showing that the phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity involve much more than a ‘solution’ to the ‘traditional’ problem of other minds. Intersubjectivity doesn’t merely concern concrete faceto-face encounters between individuals. It is also something that is at play in simple perception, in tool-use, in emotions, drives and different types of self-awareness. Ultimately, the phenomenologists would argue that a treatment of intersubjectivity requires a simultaneous analysis of the relationship between subjectivity and world. It is not possible simply to insert intersubjectivity somewhere within an already established ontology; rather, the three regions ‘self’, ‘others’, and ‘world’ belong together; they reciprocally illuminate one another, and can only be understood in their interconnection.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d607a0837ae4c8714c3049ccd3014c9b825b2c35

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In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

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Citations in the corpus

Moving in and out of synchrony: A concept for a new intervention fostering empathy through interactional movement and dance (2012, background): “Across disciplines and publications, definitions and conceptualizations of empathy vary widely (e.g., Blair & Blair, 2009; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Foster, 2011; Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007; Singer & Lamm, 2009; Zahavi, 2001).”
The phenomenology and development of social perspectives (2013, background): “Behaviour conveys embodied meaning, and as such it is “neither internal nor external, but rather beyond this artificial distinction” (Zahavi 2001, p. 153).”
Emotion and ethics: An inter-(en)active approach (2009, background): “Jean-Paul Sartre (1969) famously emphasized the conflictual nature of our frontal encounters with others (thus criticizing Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein as fundamentally Mitsein; see Zahavi 2001).”
Sociality and the life–mind continuity thesis (2009, background): “…of a phenomenologically informed approach to intersubjectivity for the cognitive sciences (e.g., Gallagher and Zahavi 2008; Gallagher 2008a; Zahavi 2001, 2005) and the enactive approach in particular (e.g., Thompson 2001, 2007), these are only the tentative beginnings of a mutually…”
Empathy, Embodiment and Interpersonal Understanding: From Lipps to Schutz (2010, unknown): “8 For further discussions of phenomenological theories of intersubjectivity, see Zahavi 1996a, 1996b, 2001, 2002, 2007, 2008.”
The extended body: a case study in the neurophenomenology of social interaction (2012, unknown): “Phenomenology has long questioned the assumption that the minds of others are completely hidden from our perception and locked away in an inner mental realm (Zahavi 2001).”
Seeing subjectivity: defending a perceptual account of other minds (2012, background): “See Zahavi (2001). is in the blush that we perceive shame, in the laughter joy” (Scheler 1954: 10).”
The semiotic hierarchy: life, consciousness, signs and language (2009, unknown): “If either p falls “outside” W, or its value for S is nil, p will be meaningless for S. (1) M (p, S) = W(p) * V(p, S)”
The Direct-Perception Model of Empathy: a Critique (2011, background): “4 Whereas Zahavi (2001, 2007, 2008) seems to subscribe to the direct-perception model of both primary intersubjectivity in the broad sense and empathy, Gallagher (2001, 2004, 2007, 2008a, b) seems to subscribe only to the direct-perception model of primary intersubjectivity in the broad sense.”