Infants' ability to distinguish between purposeful and non-purposeful behaviors

By A. Woodward. 1999

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Citations in the corpus

Machine Theory of Mind (2018, background): “There is a wealth of evidence showing that this is a core component of our model from early infancy (Gergely et al., 1995; Woodward, 1998; 1999; Buresh & Woodward, 2007), and intelligent animals such as apes and corvids have been shown to have similar expectations about their conspeciﬁcs (Call &…”
Developmental origin of the animate-inanimate distinction. (2001, background): “The study by Woodward (1999) suggests that infants do not interpret all motions through a rational path toward a goal as an intentional act.”
Use does not wear ragged the fabric of friendship: Thinking of objects as alive makes people less willing to replace them (2010, background): “…anthropomorphize objects that have human-like physical features, such as eyes (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Jipson & Gelman, 2007), hands (Woodward, 1999) or a human-like form (Aggarwal & McGill, 2007), or that behave in an apparently complex or intentional manner (Heider & Simmel 1944;…”
Image schemata in the brain (2005, background): “…reaching toward an object (Woodward 1998); then, at nine months they can distinguish between a hand grasping an object and a hand resting upon it (Woodward 1999); while at twelve months infants are able to selectively attend to objects by following changes in the direction that a caregiver…”
'Obsessed with goals': functions and mechanisms of teleological interpretation of actions in humans. (2007, background): “…2000; Phillips & Wellman, 2005), puppets (Sodian, Schoeppner & Metz, 2004), robots (Kamewari et al., 2005), geometric shapes (Gergely et al., 1995; Csibra et al., 2003; Wagner & Carey, 2005), even when these actors do not exhibit unambiguous agency or animacy cues (Csibra et al., 1999).”
One-year-old infants use teleological representations of actions productively (2003, background): “Similarly, Carpenter, Akhtar, and Tomasello (1998); see also Woodward (1999) demonstrated that 14-to 18-month-olds can recognize whether an action is intentional (hence goal-directed) or accidental and tend to imitate the intentional action only.”
Imitative games by 9-, 14-, and 18-month-old infants. (2004, background): “…to 12 months infants begin to differentiate between means and ends, discriminating between relevant or irrelevant manual actions, and factoring in whether such actions entail a human (intentional) hand or a mechanical (unintentional, inanimate) device (Woodward, 1999; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000).”
Psychological and Sociomoral Reasoning in Infancy (2014, methodology): “One set, which explored infants’ sensitivity to consistency constraints, was conducted by Amanda Woodward and her colleagues (e.g., Woodward, 1998, 1999; Woodward & Sommerville, 2000).”
Oops! Predicting Unintentional Action in Video (2019, background): “In a classic series of papers, developmental psychologist Amanda Woodward demonstrated that this ability to recognize the intentionality of action is learned by children during their first year [70, 71, 6].”
Core knowledge. (2007, background): “Instead, the intentional actions of agents are directed to goals (Woodward, 1999), and agents achieve their goals through means that are efficient (Gergely & Csibra, 2003).”
Infants’ understanding of the point gesture as an object-directed action (2002, methodology): “In some studies, only the actor’s arm was visible (Woodward, 1998, 1999), and in others the actor’s face was also visible (Guajardo & Woodward, under review; Woodward et al., 2001; Woodward, in press).”
Why verbs are hard to learn (2006, background): “Even some early insight into intentions and goals has been demonstrated (Baldwin et al., 1996; Tomasello & Barton, 1994; Woodward, 1999).”
Perceptual Features and the Development of Conceptual Knowledge (2006, background): “The idea here is that wheels (or eyes) are recognizably similar to a perceptual system that can parse objects into parts, whereas individual events of transporting (or sleeping) are not so self-similar (see, e.g., Baldwin, Baird, Saylor, & Clark, 2001; Woodward, 1999).”
Stepping off the pendulum: Why only an action-based approach can transcend the nativist–empiricist debate (2013, methodology): “…reasoning, and later numerical knowledge and spatial knowledge, looking procedures have more recently been used in the exploration of goal attribution, action parsing, intention reading and false-belief understanding (Baird & Baldwin, 2001; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Woodward, 1998, 1999).”