Sharing of Control versus Monitoring as Corporate Governance Mechanisms

By Armando Gomes, Walter Novaes. 2006

198 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d3984229edc7722d2faa16248c4e73a20c21abe6

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1. Jakob de Haan
2. Yizhe Dong
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4. Luc Laeven
5. Ross Levine
6. Michael Firth
7. Chao Meng
8. F. González

Citations in the corpus

• Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations (2007, background): “Gomes and Novaes (2001) study the ex-post bargaining among large shareholders and how this affects small shareholders.”
• Mixing Family with Business: A Study of Thai Business Groups and the Families Behind Them (2008, unknown): “For example, Gomes and Novaes (2006) suggest that under certain conditions it is optimal for founders to share control with multiple outside shareholders to increase the value of the firm, instead of just selling ownership stakes to outside shareholders.”
• The impact of bank ownership concentration on impaired loans and capital adequacy (2010, background): “These results indicate that when two or three shareholders have blocks of ownership, the quality of the portfolio of the bank may deteriorate for the reasons explained by Gomes and Novaes (1999, 2005).”
• The governance role of multiple large shareholders: evidence from the valuation of cash holdings (2011, unknown): “In the same vein, Gomes and Novaes (2005) cast doubt on the efficient monitoring role of MLS, as their model suggests that concentrated control in the hands of one large investor better protects minority shareholders than shared control among blockholders (when investment opportunities are hard for…”
• Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and implied cost of equity (2008, unknown): “For instance, Gomes and Novaes (2005) argue that bargaining problems between large shareholders have the potential to either obstruct projects harming minority shareholders or result in corporate paralysis if profitable projects are denied.”
• The Entrepreneur's Choice between Private and Public Ownership (2006, unknown): “—————– FIGURE 1 GOES HERE ————————”
• Ownership Structure and Risk-Taking: Comparative Evidence from Private and State-Controlled Banks in China (2014, background): “conflict with those of the minority ones (Gomes and Novaes, 2005).”
• Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders (2011, unknown): “or φbβ − 1 φ(2)b ln (φbβ) > σε ση , (39)”