Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and implied cost of equity

By Najah Attig, Omrane Guedhami, Dev R. Mishra. 2008

362 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ef6abc44655faf0462614a8e9a38c4aaa6d361e7

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Citations in the corpus

Multiple large shareholders, excess leverage and tunneling: evidence from an emerging market (2017, neutral): “(2008); Attig et al. (2009) and Luo et al. (2012) have rendered support by indicating that the presence of other multiple large shareholders with relative significant voting power is associated”
Political connections and the cost of equity capital (2012, neutral): “An increasing number of studies examine instead whether the impact of corporate governance on firm value is channelled through the cost of capital, which is shown to be, theoretically and empirically, driven by firms’ agency and information problems (see, e.g., Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Lambert et al”
Does Religion Matter to Equity Pricing? (2012, neutral): “Attig et al. (2008) report that the presence, number, and voting size of large shareholders beyond the controlling owner convey favorable information on the likelihood of corporate expropriation, resulting in a reduced cost of capital.”
Corporate Governance, Accounting and Finance: A Review (2011, neutral): “The same relationship that exists in the United States, where strong CG reduces the implied cost of equity capital, can also be found in low protection countries (Attig et al., 2008; Byun et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010).”
Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China (2015, methodology): “A multiple large shareholder structure in is measured in this paper by the following two proxies, following previous studies by Attig et al. (2008): SECONDLARGE, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has a second largest shareholder with no affiliation to the ultimate…”
The dark side of CEO ability: CEO general managerial skills and cost of equity capital☆ (2014, neutral): “These findings are consistent with prior findings showing that a firm’s agency problems positively affect its cost of equity (Easley and O’hara, 2004; Attig et al., 2008). Furthermore, in Model 7, we control for Gompers et al.’s (2003) governance index (GIM).”
Multiple large shareholders and corporate investment: Evidence from China (2018, positive): “The presence and control size of MLS may tend to reduce the cost of equity ﬁ nancing (Attig et al., 2008), enhance earnings informativeness (Boubaker and Sami, 2011) and increase corporate risk taking (Mishra, 2011) – all of which seem to indicate a mitigated agency problem and reduced information…”
Ownership structure, control contestability, and corporate debt maturity (2015, methodology): “This variable captures the relative weight that a coalition between the second-, third-, and fourth-largest shareholders has vis-à-vis the controlling owner (Attig et al., 2008, 2009).”
The governance role of multiple large shareholders: evidence from the valuation of cash holdings (2011, neutral): “Similarly, Maury and Pajuste (2005), Laeven and Levine (2008), and Attig et al. (2008, 2009) find support for the argument that the presence of MLS with comparable voting power or cash flow rights is associated with a valuable governance role.”