Limits of Anonymity in Open Environments
By Dogan Kesdogan, Dakshi Agrawal, Stefan Penz. 2002
184 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Sociology and Political Science
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Henry Corrigan-Gibbs
- Bryan Ford
- Dan Boneh
- David Isaac Wolinsky
- David Mazières
- Nick Mathewson
- Roger Dingledine
- Brent Waters
In Sociology and Political Science
Citations in the corpus
- Prio: Private, Robust, and Scalable Computation of Aggregate Statistics (2017, background): “The second attack is an intersection attack [20, 49, 83, 122].”
- Proactively Accountable Anonymous Messaging in Verdict (2012, background): “Similarly, Verdict does not prevent long-term intersection attacks [28] against otherwise-honest participants who repeatedly come and go during an interaction period, leaking information to an adversary who can correlate online status with linkable anonymous posts.”
- Riposte: An Anonymous Messaging System Handling Millions of Users (2015, background): “If an adversary can observe traffic patterns across many epochs, as the set of online clients changes, the adversary can make statistical inferences about which client is sending which stream of messages [24], [51], [56].”
- Hang with your buddies to resist intersection attacks (2013, unknown): “quickly lose anonymity to statistical disclosure or intersection attacks [25, 15, 6].”
- Dissent in Numbers: Making Strong Anonymity Scale (2012, unknown): “There is no perfect defense against intersection attacks when online status changes over time [39].”
- Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router (2004, unknown): “Even high-latency anonymity systems can be vulnerable to end-to-end traffic confirmation, if the traffic volumes are high enough, and if users’ habits are sufficiently distinct [14, 31].”
- Practical Traffic Analysis: Extending and Resisting Statistical Disclosure (2004, background): “In 2002, Kesdogan, Agrawal, and Penz presented the disclosure attack [22], an intersection attack against a single sender on a single batch mix.”