Asymmetric inequality aversion and noisy behavior in alternating-offer bargaining games

By Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt. 2000

131 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d00746a12cac343ed0192c556dd4dd91f5bf36b2

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Citations in the corpus

Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions (2001, background): “23 Goeree et al. (2000) report formal econometric tests that reject the predictions of inequity aversion models in the context of a group of repeated asymmetric matching pennies games.”
On the Empirical Content of Quantal Response Equilibrium (2008, unknown): “Two notable exceptions are Capra, Goeree, Gomez and Holt (1999) and Goeree and Holt (1999) which demonstrate that the QRE with a single distribution of perturbations can rationalize observed comparative statics in the travellers dilemma game and a coordination game, respectively. However, the sug”
A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences (2011, methodology): “Following Goeree and Holt (2000), we also run maximum-likelihood estimates of the”
INTERDEPENDENT PREFERENCES AND RECIPROCITY (2005, background): “Goeree and Holt (2000) attempt to test for this effect in the laboratory.”
Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical Analysis (2018, background): “Similarly, Smith and Walker (1993), Camerer and Hogarth (1999), and others study the impact of increasing monetary stakes within a single decision.”
MEASURING INEQUITY AVERSION IN A HETEROGENEOUS POPULATION USING EXPERIMENTAL DECISIONS AND SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES (2008, methodology): “We also allow choices to vary with the person’s role, since preferences may vary with someone’s role in social interaction (Goeree and Holt, 2000, and Gächter and Riedel, 2005).7 This enables us to investigate how preferences vary with background characteristics and to test whether preferences are…”
Promises, Threats and Fairness (2004, unknown): “The standard analysis, due to Grossman and Hart (1986), Grout (1984), and Tirole (1986), assumes that agents are selfish and that they are completely unable to commit to future actions. Both assumptions square badly with our findings. Indeed, our work belongs to a long line of experiments that sugge”
Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices (2000, background): “For a combination of stochastic game theory with our theory of inequity aversion see Goeree and Holt (1999).”