Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices

By Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt. 2000

250 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/31c70d0482170efbe234422bc3dcb1cc54f62f95

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Demography

1. Ernst Fehr
2. Simon Gächter
3. Klaus M. Schmidt
4. John A. List
5. Imran Rasul
6. Aldo Rustichini
7. Georg Kirchsteiger
8. Luca Rigotti

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Ernst Fehr
2. John A. List
3. Klaus M. Schmidt
4. Simon Gächter
5. Armin Falk
6. Imran Rasul
7. Jayson L. Lusk
8. Aldo Rustichini

In Safety Research

1. Ernst Fehr
2. John A. List
3. Klaus M. Schmidt
4. Simon Gächter
5. Armin Falk
6. Imran Rasul
7. Gary Charness
8. Aldo Rustichini

Citations in the corpus

• Your morals might be your moods (2006, methodology): “This is the argument pursued by Fehr and GÄachter [15] and Fehr and Schmidt [20].”
• Public Preferences and Private Choices: Effect of Altruism and Free Riding on Demand for Environmentally Certified Pork (2007, background): “3. A number of other explanations for the laboratory behavior have been put forth such as respondent confusion (Andreoni 1995) or decision error (Anderson et al. 1998), considerations of fairness ( Fehr and Schmidt 2000 ), and degree of confidentiality (Andreoni and Petrie 2004), just to name a few.”
• Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness (2001, background): “B. Implications of Reciprocal Fairness It is well known from day to day experience and from many controlled experiments that a nonnegligible fraction of the people do behave in a reciprocally fair manner (see, e.g., Camerer 2000, Fehr and Schmidt 2000).”
• Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts (2010, unknown): “…a re- sponse to the vast experimental evidence challenging the standard hypothesis of sel shness .9 A variety of models were devised to explain these observations.10 It would be too di¢ cult to discuss all the models, so we refer to the excellent surveys of Fehr and Schmidt (2000) and Sobel (2005).”
• Field experiments in labor economics (2010, background): “effort relative to paying nothing (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000), and where explicit incentives sometimes result in worse compliance than incomplete labor contracts (Fehr and Falk, 1999; Fehr and Schmidt, 2000).”