Principled and statistical connections in common sense conception.

By Sandeep Prasada, Elaine M. Dillingham. 2006

208 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Molecular Biology

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Citations in the corpus

Explanation in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Social Sciences (2017, background): “[148, p. 2] Prasada and Dillingham [149] note that people represent relationships between the kinds of things and the properties that they posses.”
The explanatory effect of a label: Explanations with named categories are more satisfying. (2017, background): “…presence of a name establishes what Prasada and colleagues call a ‘‘principled connection” between the category and the relevant behavior, leading to a boost in explanatory satisfaction that results from the construal of the behavior as an aspect of the category (Prasada & Dillingham, 2006, 2009).”
Explanation and categorization: how "why?" informs "what?". (2009, background): “…than exclusively causal concepts would come from the finding that non-causal explanations impact the importance of features in categorization (see Prasada & Dillingham, 2006, for indirect but suggestive evidence that this is so), or that the quality of explanations modulates effects of causal…”
Cognitive foundations for science assessment design: Knowing what students know about evolution (2012, background): “Specifically, Journal of Research in Science Teaching psychologists (with roots in Aristotle) have identified three types of explanations (Lombrozo & Carey, 2006; Opfer & Gelman, 2001; Prasada & Dillingham, 2006).”
The scope of formal explanation (2017, background): “Prasada and Dillingham (2006) found that formal explanations that were given to explain the presence of k-properties in an instance of a kind were rated as being much better than formal explanations given to explain the presence of properties that do not have a principled connection to the kind,…”
GENERICS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE MIND (2007, background): “See Prasada and Dillingham (2006a, b) for an intriguing discussion of the role of generic knowledge in licensing such normative beliefs. 3. Elizabeth Shipley (1993) suggests that much early learning proceeds in this manner. (She calls characteristic dimensions ‘overhypotheses’, but the idea is much ”
Explanation and Abductive Inference (2012, background): “…and explaining by appeal to the objects' category membership (“it's round because it's a tire”) would qualify as formal (see Lombrozo & Carey, 2006, for an extended discussion of mechanistic and functional explanations; see Prasada & Dillingham, 2006, for a discussion of formal explanations).”