Technology Acquisition in Family and Nonfamily Firms: A Longitudinal Analysis of Spanish Manufacturing Firms
By J. Kotlar, Alfredo De Massis, Federico Frattini, Mattia Bianchi, H. Fang. 2013
244 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cb22c6aa25a75384b2dcc35c4bfcd76af4b51571
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Alfredo De Massis
- J. Kotlar
- Jess H. Chua
- Mattias Nordqvist
- Andrea Calabro
- Federico Frattini
- Pietro Mazzola
- Salvatore Sciascia
In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Alfredo De Massis
- J. Kotlar
- James J. Chrisman
- Federico Frattini
- Andrea Calabro
- Mike Wright
- Pietro Mazzola
- Jess H. Chua
In Strategy and Management
- Alfredo De Massis
- Andrea Calabro
- Johanna Gast
- Sascha Kraus
- M. del Giudice
- Mariangela Vecchiarini
- Johan Frishammar
- Pietro Mazzola
Citations in the corpus
- Tax avoidance, corporate governance, and corporate social responsibility: The case of the Egyptian capital market (2020, background): “Generally, family firms’ behavior and practices are driven by economic and non-economic objectives (Kotlar et al., 2013).”
- Ability and Willingness as Sufficiency Conditions for Family‐Oriented Particularistic Behavior: Implications for Theory and Empirical Studies (2014, methodology): “Behavioral theory (Cyert and March 1963) has been used as the basis for proposing that family firms are more willing to pursue the emotional value of ownership (Astrachan and Jaskiewicz 2008; Zellweger and Astrachan 2008), emphasize the creation and conservation of socioemotional wealth for the fami”
- Strategic agility and international joint ventures: The willingness-ability paradox of family firms (2020, background): “Therefore, when emotional attachment is strong, family owners are less likely to engage in IJVs because they see the uncertainty related to share own knowledge and assimilate external one as a threat to maintaining their socio-emotional endowment (Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Kotlar et al., 2013).”
- Technological Innovation Inputs, Outputs, and Performance (2016, background): “Finally, given that organizations with greater financial resources have higher levels of financial slack to invest in new projects, we controlled for firm leverage (Kotlar et al., 2013) and the subsidies for innovation received by firms (Raymond, Mohnen, Palm, & van der Loeff, 2010).”
- The Ability and Willingness Paradox in Family Firm Innovation (2015, background): “For instance, in their attempt to preserve control over innovation, family firms do not have the same inclination to engage in open innovation in comparison with nonfamily firms (Chesbrough, 2003; Kotlar et al., 2013).”
- The dark side of knowledge transfer: Exploring knowledge leakage in joint R&D projects (2015, background): “As a result, while firms have increasingly sourced technology in recent years through collaborative efforts (Calantone and Stanko, 2007), firms also face potential appropriability problems and knowledge leakage (Kotlar et al., 2013).”
- Innovation in Family Firms: A Systematic Literature Review and Guidance for Future Research (2018, background): “However, through an integration with behavioural assumptions, Kotlar et al. (2013) find that negative aspiration performance gaps are likely to stimulate the acquisition of external technologies or even make profitability goals more important than control needs; this effect is weakened with high…”
- Organizational responses to performance feedback: A meta-analytic review (2019, background): “Interestingly, Kotlar et al. (2013) also found that private and family-owned firms may be more sensitive to social performance feedback but are less sensitive to historical performance feedback.”
- Family Ownership and R&D Intensity in Small‐ and Medium‐Sized Firms (2015, background): “Moreover, investing in R&D typically entails ceding shares to outside parties such as venture capitalists or institutional investors (Kotlar et al., 2013), thus implying a restriction of family control and a threat to the family’s SEW.”