Anomalies: The Winner's Curse

By Richard H. Thaler. 1988

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Citations in the corpus

Taming the Noise in Reinforcement Learning via Soft Updates (2015, background): “This problem is akin to the “winner’s curse” in auctions [6, 7, 8, 9].”
Corporate Venture Capital and the Returns to Acquiring Portfolio Companies (2010, unknown): “By reducing information asymmetries in markets to acquire entrepreneurial firms, the provision of venture capital could help corporations mitigate the ‘‘winner’s curse’’ of overpayment in the event of subsequent acquisition (Thaler, 1988).”
The effect of target-firm accounting quality on valuation in acquisitions (2014, unknown): “However, Thaler (1988) describes the difficulty of acting rationally in auctions.”
Efficiency in auctions with Private and Common Values (2002, background): “Field studies also suggest that bidders are bothered by a winner’s curse, see, e.g., E. C. Capen et al. (1971), Richard Roll (1986), Richard H. Thaler (1988), and Orley Ashenfelter and David Genesove (1992).”
The desire to win: The effects of competitive arousal on motivation and behavior (2010, background): “The mechanism underlying the winner’s curse is incomplete information and a tendency to ignore the perspectives and decisions of other parties (Bazerman & Samuelson, 1983; Crawford & Iriberri, 2007; Thaler, 1988).”
Do Auctions Induce a Winner's Curse? New Evidence from the Corporate Takeover Market (2008, background): “Thaler (1988), for example, cites the data on acquirer returns in corporate takeovers as a”
Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? (2007, methodology): “It has since been detected in many analyses of field data (Hendricks, Porter, and Boudreau (1987); Hendricks and Porter (1988); and the papers surveyed in McAfee and McMillan (1987, Section XII), Thaler (1988), Wilson (1992, Section 9.2), and Laffont (1997, Section 3)).”
Target’s earnings quality and bidders’ takeover decisions (2013, unknown): “Thus we propose that this ‘‘favorable selection’’ argument, combined 11 Surveys by Thaler (1988), Barberis and Thaler (2006), and Baker et al. (2006) conclude that the winner’s curse holds in corporate takeover auctions.”
G-Learning: Taming the Noise in Reinforcement Learning via Soft Updates (2015, background): “This bias is the well known " winner's curse " problem in economics and decision theory [6] [7] [8] [9], and in the context of Q-learning it was studied before in [3] [12] [13] [14].”
Does Online Community Participation Foster Risky Financial Behavior? (2012, background): “Therefore, a higher winning bid for an auctioned item implies a greater likelihood that the bidder has overpaid for the item and is likely to regret it afterward (e.g., Thaler 1988), leading to greater financial risk for the bidder.”
Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents? (2006, methodology): “The winner’s curse cannot occur if all bidders are rational (Cox and Isaac, 1984, 1986), and therefore evidence of the winner’s curse in market settings is considered by Thaler (1988, 1992) to be an anomaly.”
Double Q-learning (2010, background): “It is a bias related to the Winner’s Curse in auctions [17, 18] and it can be shown to follow from Jensen’s inequality [19].”