Do-gooders and go-getters: career incentives, selection, and performance in public service delivery

By Nava Ashraf, O. Bandiera, Scott S. Lee, Elena Moroz, Shotaro Nakamura, Sara Lowes. 2014

133 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations (2020, background): “…in this growing literature have analyzed the role of incentives in the selection and performance of public sector workers (Dal Bó et al., 2013; Ashraf et al., 2016; Khan et al., 2016; Fisman and Wang, 2017; Deserranno, 2017; Weaver, 2017; Ashraf and Bandiera, 2017; Bertrand et al., 2018;…”
Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Village Promoters in Uganda (2019, methodology): “In contrast with most of the existing literature that observes only the job applicants (e.g., Dal Bó et al. 2013; Ashraf et al. 2017), this paper is able to explore correlations within the full sample of potential candidates thanks to information on both applicants and non-applicants.”
The Economist as Plumber (2017, background): “The Ashraf, Bandiera, and Lee (2015) study and the Deserranno (2015) studies that I mentioned earlier provide examples of how a plumbing experiment can help us make progress on difficult-to-settle empirical issues: in both studies, the authors used the different recruitment strategies to create…”
Chapter 6 – The Personnel Economics of the Developing State (2017, methodology): “In the study by Ashraf et al. (2015), the authors used the two different recruitment strategies to create variation in the type of health promoters that were recruited.”