Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe

By L. Enriques, Paolo F. Volpin. 2007

504 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c667cc8ea8849b292ae2b4cee840f94bda7d8680

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Citations in the corpus

Geographical pathways for SME internationalization: insights from an Italian sample (2013, background): “In other words, this measure gauges the presence of managers who are apparently independent of the governing family (Enriques and Volpin, 2007).”
One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence (2007, unknown): “Thus, in countries like Sweden, where family control is ubiquitous, but the legal environment and media awareness are strong, the measured value of control is likely to understate the value of private benefits of control substantially.34 There is another sample selection problem that is related to b”
Explaining diversity in the worldwide diffusion of codes of good governance (2010, background): “For instance, d’Iribarne’s (1989) research on French MNEs in France, the USA and the Netherlands found a strong emotional character of hierarchical relationships in France.”
Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation (2010, background): “4For accounts on this debate see Arrunada and Paz-Ares (1997); Dopuch, King, and Schwartz (2001); Myers, Myers, and Omer (2003); and Enriques and Volpin (2007)).”
Comparative and International Corporate Governance (2010, background): “Looking at the EU, Enriques and Volpin ( 2007 ) have revisited the discussion on European ownership structure and shareholder rights focusing on France, Italy, and Germany in contrast to the United States.”
Complex Ownership and Capital Structure (2012, unknown): “(1999); Faccio and Lang (2002)).(10) If a firm has such an ultimate owner, we classify it as ultimately owned firm. In our sample, 42.94% of the firms are classified as ultimately owned. France and Germany are the countries with the highest percentage of ultimately owned firms, 93.72% and 92.71% res”
Integrating agency and resource dependence theory: Firm profitability, industry regulation, and board task performance (2013, background): “The Italian setting Italy is an appropriate setting to conduct research on boards of directors: first, since a decade the Italian regulators engaged into a great debate that resulted into increasing pressure 12 on board scrutiny (Enriques & Volpin, 2007).”
Ownership of Corporations (2016, unknown): “Not only are blockholders prominent investors (La Porta et al., 1999), but they can also be used are a tool to create a divergence between controlling rights and cash flow rights (e.g., Enriques & Volpin, 2007).”