Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation

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Shadow Banking in a Crisis: Evidence from Fintech During COVID-19 (2021, unknown): “…by commercial banks (Song and Xiong (2018)); this is different 4The selection bias may obscure the analyses of the quality of loans (see, e.g., Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini (2010); Dobbie, Goldsmith-Pinkham, Mahoney, and Song (2020)); therefore, we restrict the loan records to span…”
Competition and Relationship Lending: Friends or Foes? (2011, unknown): “On the other hand, in order to avoid the formation of information rent and mitigate agency problems, loan officers are frequently asked to rotate within large banks and are discouraged from basing lending decisions on soft information (Hertzberg et al., 2009).”
Bargaining power and information in SME lending (2010, background): “Hertzberg et al. (2010) show that loan officer turnover is an effective device used to maintain incentives inside the bank (i.e., to avoid collusion between loan officers and borrowers).”
Cultural proximity and loan outcomes (2017, unknown): “[37] Hertzberg, Andrew, Jose Liberti, and Daniel Paravisini, 2010, “Information and Incentives inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation,” Journal of Finance, 65(3): 795-828.”