Entrepreneurial Signaling via Education: A Success Factor in Innovative Start-Ups

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The Schumpeterian entrepreneur: a review of the empirical evidence on the antecedents, behaviour and consequences of innovative entrepreneurship (2017, unknown): “Using a sample of German start-ups, Backes-Gellner and Werner (2007) find that innovative start-ups who use signaling via the founder’s (university) education degree increase their chances to find qualified personnel.”
Signaling in Equity Crowdfunding (2015, unknown): “Naturally, an entrepreneur is assumed to be more knowledgeable about a venture’s true value than a potential investor (see, for example, Backes-Gellner & Werner, 2007; Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2005; Michael, 2009).”
The role of information asymmetry in the choice of entrepreneurial exit routes (2014, background): “, 2003) and signal potential lenders, employees, and customers about the future productivity of the business (Backes-Gellner and Werner, 2007).”
The value of an educated population for an individual's entrepreneurship success (2014, unknown): “Recent studies show that entrepreneurs may use their education as a signal toward suppliers of capital (Parker and Van Praag, 2006) or (prospective) customers and highly qualified employees (Backes-Gellner and Werner, 2007).”