Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution

By Massimo Motta, Michele Polo. 2003

455 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c45c84e95cf136077f8955f05f330eee64eba195

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Citations in the corpus

Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust (2006, background): “The model is closest to Motta and Polo (2003), in that leniency is awarded to firms that report after their cartel has been ected and an investigation has been opened (Sections B of the current US leniency program and paragraphs 8b and 10 of the EU one) namely at the prosecution stage.”
The impact of the corporate leniency program on cartel formation and the cartel price path (2005, background): “This property is to be contrasted with the models of Motta and Polo (2003) and Harrington (2005a) where the probability of detection is stochastic.”
Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority (2004, background): “Spagnolo (2000) and Motta and Polo (2003) consider the effects of leniency programs on the incentives to collude in a repeated game of perfect monitoring.11 Though considering collusive behavior in a dynamic setting with antitrust laws, these articles exclude the sources of dynamics that are the…”
Leniency policies and illegal transactions (2006, background): “…individual crimes (Kaplow and Shavell, 1994), and may have deterrence effects on long term illegal relationships as it may facilitate prosecution (Motta and Polo, 2003), and increase both the incentives to defect and report and the bstrategic riskQ of entering an illegal arrangement (Spagnolo,…”
An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program (2009, background): “First, when the probability of detection exogenously increases, this option may become more valuable to cartel members vis-à-vis the option to continuing collusion (e.g., Motta and Polo 2003).”
Blowing the Whistle (2003, background): “However, as first noted and theoretically elaborated on by Motta and Polo (2003) and Spagnolo (2000a,b), it is not obvious”
Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement (2009, background): “9826, and a likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the underlying population parameter equals one.(30)”
Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs (2008, background): “When the probability is fixed, a maximally lenient policy is then optimal and, in fact, Spagnolo [2003] establishes the desirability of offering a reward to the first firm to come forward.”
The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels (2006, background): “One such system7 is the U.S. Civil False Claims Act, which has been used extensively to attack fraud involving the U.S. government's role as purchaser of goods and services (e.g., procurement fraud against the Department of Defense) and as insurer (e.g., fraud involving health care programs covered ”
Cartel pricing dynamics with cost variability and endogenous buyer detection (2006, unknown): “Given that if such suspicions emerge they could initiate a process that ultimately means the collapse of the cartel ⁎ Corresponding author.”
On the Design of Leniency Programs (2013, unknown): “Hence, as Motta and Polo (2003) and Spagnolo (2004) show, firms cannot use antitrust fines in order to punish deviators.”
fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust (2009, unknown): “Related Literature The theoretical literature on leniency policies in antitrust, initiated by Motta and Polo (2003) and surveyed in Rey (2003) and Spagnolo (2008), has shown that these policies can be very e¤ective in deterring and destabilizing cartels, but”