fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust

By M. Bigoni, S. Fridolfsson, C. Coq, Giancarlo Spagnolo. 2009

183 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes (2013, unknown): “Barr and Serra (2009) find that bribes are less likely to be offered and accepted in the laboratory when the experimental instructions explicitly describe a bribery scenario instead of a more abstract description.(14) Consequently, we can”
Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? Experimental evidence (2015, methodology): “…unlimited communication which facilitates collusion.7 In practice a ringleader may also be the rm that initiates the communication.8 As opposed to former experiments by Bigoni et al. (2012), Hesch (2012), and Wandschneider (2012), the emergence of a ringleader is not deterministic in our setting.”
On the Design of Leniency Programs (2013, unknown): “It is also in line with evidence from experiments; Bigoni et al. (2012) show for instance that when subjects are allowed to selfreport before as well as after observing pricing decisions, then deviators often report the cartel under leniency, to protect them from fines.”