Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority

By Jr. Joseph E. Harrington. 2004

182 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/34cc104c41e35db36ebf869c6bafc59c73e7796a

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In Economics and Econometrics

1. Cécile Aubert
2. Patrick Rey
3. Giancarlo Spagnolo

Citations in the corpus

• The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels (2006, background): “For example, Harrington (2004) stresses that antitrust authorities' tendency to intervene in the case of sudden price changes may facilitate collusion, by discouraging deviations from it.”
• POST-CARTEL PRICING DURING LITIGATION (2004, unknown): “Assume a = 100, c = 10, (b, e) ∈ {(10, 5) , (10, 9)} , αθ ∈ {1, 3, 6}, and δ = .”