An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program
By Steffen Brenner. 2009
197 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1e8a3eb3f570b29415e98efb07e5765981a9ccc7
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Citations in the corpus
- fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust (2009, unknown): “We mentioned earlier the important recent empirical studies by Miller (2009) and Brenner (2009), as well as their limited ability to observe prices and to evaluate policies that have”
- Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement (2009, methodology): “I take the theoretical model to the complete set of indictments and information reports issued by the DOJ between January 1, 1985 and March 15, 2005.(5) I use these documents to construct a time-series of cartel discoveries.”
- Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? Experimental evidence (2015, background): “…is superior to a leniency policy which reduces the ne. Empirical contributions by Miller (2009) and Brenner (2009) evaluate the e ciency of the US and EU leniency programs showing that the former (Miller, 2009) enhances cartel detection while the latter fails to destabilize cartels (Brenner, 2009).”