The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels

By Cécile Aubert, Patrick Rey, William E. Kovacic. 2006

319 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs (2008, unknown): “The papers of, for example, Spagnolo [2003] and Aubert, Kovacic and Rey [2006] are largely complementary to the current one.”
Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement (2009, background): “In this paper, I provide empirical evidence regarding the efficacy of leniency based on the experience in the United States.”
Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? Experimental evidence (2015, background): “Spagnolo (2004) and Aubert et al. (2006) have shown that a reward system where whistleblowers obtain a bonus payment for reporting the cartel is superior to a leniency policy which reduces the ne. Empirical contributions by Miller (2009) and Brenner (2009) evaluate the e ciency of the US and EU…”
On the Design of Leniency Programs (2013, unknown): “…and the risk of exploitation.4 Finally, several papers have focused on other aspects of leniency programs, assuming away any risk of exploitation.5 Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic (2006) argue, for instance, that rewarding individuals can deter collusion more effectively than corporate leniency—and can…”