Sad, thus true: negativity bias in judgments of truth

By Benjamin E. Hilbig. 2009

107 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Abstract An effect observable across many different domains is that negative instances tend to be more influential than comparably positive ones. This phenomenon has been termed the negativity bias. In the current work, it was investigated whether this effect pertains to judgments of truth. That is, it was hypothesized that information valence and perceived validity should be associated such that more negative information is deemed more true. This claim was derived from the findings that negative instances tend to demand more attentional resources and that more elaborate processing can render messages more persuasive. In three experiments, manipulating information valence through framing – and assessing judgments of truth – the hypothesized negativity bias was corroborated. Potential explanations and implications for further research are discussed.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Literature and Literary Theory, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c411f94b14d2cd853df78dee206b5bac82517238

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Cognitive Neuroscience

1. Thomas Koch
2. Ingo Zettler
3. Marc Solga
4. Christina Peter

In Literature and Literary Theory

1. Thomas Koch
2. Ingo Zettler
3. Marc Solga
4. Christina Peter

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Thomas Koch
2. Ingo Zettler
3. Marc Solga
4. Christina Peter
5. Benjamin E. Hilbig

Citations in the corpus

• Not Enough of a ‘Dark’ Trait? Linking Machiavellianism to Job Performance (2013, background): “On the basis of research that has repeatedly shown that people focus more on negative compared with positive aspects and react to the former more strongly (e.g. Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Hilbig, 2009; Rozin & Royzman, 2001), Ames and Flynn concluded—and found corresponding e”
• When Debunking Scientific Myths Fails (and When It Does Not) (2016, background): “Yet, studies in the context of framing research have shown that negative statements are judged to be more credible than positive ones (Hilbig, 2009, 2012; Koch, Peter, & Obermaier, 2013).”