Lobbying and Taxes

By Brian K. Richter, Krislert Samphantharak, Jeffrey F. Timmons. 2009

419 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c407f2d710614b0467d65416e659ee22b256834c

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate lobbying, political connections, and the bailout of banks (2013, background): “Economists have long noted that firms that lobby or maintain other types of political connections receive a variety of economic benefits in return (Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons, 2009; Hochberg, Sapienza, and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2009; Igan, Mishra, and Tressel, 2009; Stratmann, 1991; Cooper et…”
Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness (2013, neutral): “For example, Richter et al. (2009) find that firms spend more on lobbying in a given year pay lower effective tax rates in the next year.”
Individuals, interactions and institutions: How economic inequality affects organizations (2015, background): “Under conditions of high inequality, firms and rich individuals resist taxation through lobbying (Richter et al., 2009), which reduces the tax revenue for the government (Gupta et al.”
The Corporate Value of (Corrupt) Lobbying (2016, neutral): “…(House) Appropriations Committee member; Kang (2012) shows that lobbying expenditures by the energy sector yield average returns of 102% to 113%; Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons (2009) find that U.S. firms that spend more on lobbying have lower effective tax rates; and, Yu and Yu (2011)…”
Social Media and Corruption (2018, background): “15 competitors or firm-specific tax breaks.28 As shown by Richter et al. (2009), political connections are associated with smaller effective tax rates even in countries with mature markets and strong political institutions such as the United States.”
Political activity and firm performance within nonmarket research: A review and international comparative assessment (2015, positive): “This finding is consistent with Richter et al. (2009) who reported that in the United States, firms which lobby more in a given year pay lower effective tax rates in the next year.”