The Corporate Value of (Corrupt) Lobbying
By A. Borisov, Eitan Moshe Goldman, Nandini Gupta. 2016
199 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ac2eff02b057dcdf71a7144c1755241eb55ca934
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Citations in the corpus
- Policy uncertainty and corporate credit spreads (2020, unknown): “Establishing political connections can not only help firms benefit from policy outcomes, but also can act as a hedge against government policy uncertainty (see the literature on corporate lobbying and political connections: Durnev (2010); Boutchkova et al. (2012); Julio & Yook (2012); Pastor & Veron”
- Does Political Corruption Impede Firm Innovation? Evidence from the United States (2019, background): “Borisov, Goldman, and Gupta (2015) show that U.S. firms benefit from potentially corrupt lobbying practices.”
- Social Capital, Trust, and Firm Performance: The Value of Corporate Social Responsibility during the Financial Crisis: Social Capital, Trust, and Firm Performance (2017, unknown): “Thus, the average and median firm has more CSR concerns than strengths, consistent with Deng, Kang, and Low (2013), Servaes and Tamayo (2013), and Borisov, Goldman, and Gupta (2016).”