The effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in Israel: 1989–1998

By Adi Brender. 2003

362 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c3d03f131176066ffa4837e8b2a3f9c559c9c3ed

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Citations in the corpus

How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries (2008, methodology): “This latter classification is in line with the methodology of Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998) and Brender (2003).8 In Table 1 we show the distribution of election campaigns according to the two definitions.”
Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why? (2006, background): “See also Brender (2003).”
Political budget cycles in Indonesia at the district level (2013, background): “The bulk of empirical evidence supports the notion that political budget cycles (PBCs)may be found in young democracies, while there is much less evidence that voters in established democracies reward pre-election increases in spending (Brender, 2003; Brender and Drazen, 2005; Shi and Svensson, 2006”
Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting (2004, neutral): “Subsequent work of Brender and Drazen (2003) showed that the evidence of cycles in developed countries is unrobust and depends on few influential observations, whereas evidence from developing countries is driven by immature democracies.”
Term limits and political budget cycles at the local level: evidence from a young democracy (2015, neutral): “These later studies were aligned somewhat with the “voters as fiscal conservatives” concept (Brender (2003); Brender & Drazen (2008); Peltzman (1992)), for which the median voter prefers less - rather than more - government spending and thus 1Important initial references on opportunistic political…”
Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities (2008, background): “Similarly to Peltzman (1992) and Brender (2003) , their results indicate that Colombian voters penalize the incumbent party for running high deficits before elections, providing them with a lower proportion of votes.”
Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti Tax Evasion Program (2016, neutral): “Retrospective voting models have received considerable empirical support, in the context of fiscal stabilization, for example, which is the setting of this study (Brender, 2003; Brender and Drazen (2008); Alesina, Carloni, and Lecce (2011)).”
ELECTORAL AND PARTISAN CYCLES IN ECONOMIC POLICIES AND OUTCOMES (2002, background): “…1988; Keech & Pak 1989; Sheffrin 1989; Alesina & Roubini 1992; Alesina et al. 1992, 1997; Krueger & Turan 1993; Schultz 1995; Fouda 1997; Price 1998; Brender 1999; Franzese 1999, 2002a,b; Gonzalez 1999a,b, 2000; Moyo 1999; Schuknecht 1999, 2000; Khemani 2000; Shi & Svensson 2001; Block 2001a,b;…”
Do political variables affect fiscal policy adjustment decisions? New empirical evidence (2007, background): “4 However, there is also some evidence suggesting that a strong deterioration of the financial position of the government harms the chances of re-election faced by the incumbent (see, for instance, Brender 2003 ).”
Output fluctuations and fiscal policy: U.S. state and local governments 1978-1994 (2001, methodology): “The "rst is that voters punish politicians at the See Peltzman (1992), and Brender (1999) for interesting evidence from Israel.”
The Political Economy of Government Debt (2015, positive): “Brender and Drazen (2005) however, challenge these results. They find that the existence of political budget cycles do not depend on voting rules. Political budget cycles exist only in “new democracies,” where fiscal manipulation may work because voters are inexperienced with electoral politics or m”
Democracy, Elections and Allocation of Public Expenditure in Developing Countries (2009, background): “Indeed, following Peltzman’s work on the United States (1992), recent studies have found evidence that voters punish rather than reward election-year deficit spending in Latin America (Kraemer, 1997), Israel (Brender, 2003) and Colombia (Drazen and Eslava, 2005).”
Fighting with one hand tied behind the back: political budget cycles in the West German states (2009, background): “…in both economics and political science and a number of highly diversified theories 3See, inter alia, Peltzman (1992); Alesina et al. (1998); Brender (2003); Buti and van der Noord (2003); Von Hagen (2003); Andrikopoulos et al. (2004); Brender and Drazen (2005); Drazen and Eslava (2005);…”