Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting

By A. Akhmedov, E. Zhuravskaya. 2004

522 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cd2b69171ea98340baf54b3eb268364bb3cd5915

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Citations in the corpus

The Politics of Monetary Policy (2010, background): “Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) use a monthly panel data set on Russia in the period 1995-2003 and nd strong evidence of opportunistic budget cycles.”
Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: new evidence at the municipal level (2011, methodology): “11 The inclusion of dummies for the year before and after the election period was inspired by Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) and Veiga and Veiga (2007).”
The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy (2007, background): “Furthermore, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), analyzing political budget cycles in Russia after its transition to democracy, have found that the magnitude of the cycles decreased over time.”
Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures (2011, background): “2 Also Alt & Lassen (2003) and Akhmedov & Zhuravskaya (2004) flnd that greater flscal transparency (the probability that voters learn the incumbent’s characteristics costlessly) is associated with smaller PBCs.”
Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence (2013, unknown): “…quality and informed voters Shi and Svensson (2006), Alt and Rose (2009) Vergne (2009) Age of democracy Brender and Drazen (2005, 2007, 2008), Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), Barberia and Avelino (2011), Klomp and de Haan (2013a) Vergne (2009), Klomp and de Haan (2013b) Level of democracy…”
Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India (2008, result): “Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) nd similar results in Russia: regions with higher levels of voter awareness, greater education, and more urbanization experience smaller cycles.”
Fighting with one hand tied behind the back: political budget cycles in the West German states (2009, background): “7For example, Tufte (1978), Alesina and Roubini (1992); Franzese (2002b). 8Alesina et al. (1992, 1997); Shi and Svensson (2006); Persson and Tabellini (2003a). 9Brender and Drazen (2005); Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2005); De Haan and Sturm (1994); Drazen and Eslava (2005); Seitz (2000).”
Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? (2010, unknown): “4Studies that find strong support for opportunistic cycles in young and imperfect democracies include Schuknecht (2000), Block (2002), Gonzalez (2002), Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), Brender and Drazen (2005), and Shi and Svensson (2006). Weak support for opportunistic cycles in developed countrie”
Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies (2005, background): “However, this covers a time period so far before the election in the first case (and may still miss the few months nearest to the election) that the dummy may also be a poor indicator of pre-electoral effects, especially if fiscal manipulation to gain votes is strongest in the months right before an”
The Political Economy of Government Debt (2015, unknown): “Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) find that measures of the freedom of the regional media and the transparency of the regional governments are important predictors of the magnitude of the cycle.”
Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities (2008, background): “In a study evaluating local Russian governmental entities, Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) find that pre-electoral manipulation of fiscal instruments increases the incumbent’s chances of getting reelected, while Veiga and Veiga (2007b) use data from Portuguese municipalities”
Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Italian Cities (2017, unknown): “(6)For the reasons that threaten the identification in Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), his identification had to rely on instruments. (7)Eslava (2006) confirms these findings underlining the change in the composition of public spending in local budgets, that is not followed by an increase in the to”
Sending the Pork Home: Birth Town Bias in Transfers to Italian Municipalities (2016, unknown): “Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) or, in the Italian context, Repetto (2015) and Alesina and Paradisi (2014).”
Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016, background): “…may exert an impact on the magnitude of PBCs have been studied: the quality of institutions by Shi and Svensson (2006), government transparency by Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), corruption by Shi and Svensson (2006), globalization by Efthyvoulou (2011), social capital measured by the level of…”