The Political Economy of Government Debt

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Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Italian Cities (2017, unknown): “…and by Drazen and Eslava (2010) for Colombia.7 Foremny and Riedel (2014) document evidence of political budget cycles in a sample of German municipalities by looking at business taxes.8 More generally see Alesina and Passalacqua (2016) for a review of Politico-economic models of budget deficits.”
Understanding Inflation as a Joint Monetary-Fiscal Phenomenon (2016, background): “Alesina and Passalacqua (2016) identify several reasons why governments may pursue policies that raise government debt to suboptimally high levels: (1) fiscal illusion—voters misunderstand the budget identity and are enticed to vote for a party that supports unsustainable tax cuts or spending increa”