Multiple Directorships and Acquirer Returns
By Seoungpil Ahn, P. Jiraporn, Young Sang Kim. 2010
259 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c3c12e9f7abcc57ac8efcd2051cba3a40911ae53
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Citations in the corpus
- Does the board of directors affect cash holdings? A study of French listed firms (2013, unknown): “Along this line of reasoning, Ahn et al. (2010) emphasize the adverse agency effects of board busyness by showing that acquisitions tend to be value destroying in firms with busy boards.”
- Beyond gender diversity: How specific attributes of female directors affect earnings management (2017, background): “In support of the busyness hypothesis, Ahn et al. (2010) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that multiple directorships reduce the monitoring quality of the board, because directors with multiple board seats have less time available to consider in detail the managerial issues of all firms (Fich &…”
- Female board directorship and firm performance: What really matters? (2018, background): “…excessive EO pay ( Core et al., 1999 ), greater attendance problems suggest- ng weaker monitoring ( Adams and Ferreira, 2008 ), a negative maret reaction to the increased potential workload of these directors Falato et al., 2014 ), and more likely value-destroying acquisitions Ahn et al., 2010 ).”