Two-Stage Contests with Budget Constraints: An Experimental Study

By James E. Parco, Wilfred Amaldoss, Amnon Rapoport. 2004

120 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: General Decision Sciences, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c2ebb94d1fa85fd1c0ffb883f0de9956f37f3dfb

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In General Decision Sciences

1. Dan Kovenock
2. Emmanuel Dechenaux
3. Roman M. Sheremeta
4. Curtis R. Price
5. Subhasish M. Chowdhury

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Emmanuel Dechenaux
2. Roman M. Sheremeta
3. Dan Kovenock

In Safety Research

1. Emmanuel Dechenaux
2. Dan Kovenock
3. Roman M. Sheremeta
4. Curtis R. Price
5. Subhasish M. Chowdhury
6. Shakun D. Mago
7. Anya Samak

Citations in the corpus

• Facing Your Opponents (2014, unknown): “…expected payoff equation (2) as follows: pwi ei; e ið Þ ¼ pi ei; e ið Þðvþ wÞ ei: ð5Þ The addition of a nonmonetary utility of winning w in equation (5) is similar to the theoretical models presented in Parco, Rapoport, and Amaldoss (2005); Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009); and Sheremeta (2010b, 2013).”
• Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic versus Psychological Momentum (2012, unknown): “This misperception and the resulting errors are explored by Parco et al. (2005) and Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009) as an explanation for observed deviations from Nash equilibrium play in lottery contests.”
• Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests (2009, background): “ Parco et al. (2005) show that descriptive model, which”
• Endowment Effects in Contests (2009, background): “suggests that winning may be a component in a subject’s utility ( Parco et al., 2005; Sheremeta,”
• A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments (2014, methodology): “Parco et al. (2005) study this model with a two-group two-player experimental design, and find significantly higher effort than predicted in the first stage and, as a consequence, significantly lower effort in the second stage.”
• Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests (2010, unknown): “For example, in many political competitions, candidates who spend more money in early stages are often faced with budget constraints in the final stage of the competition (Parco, Rapoport, and Amaldoss 2005).”
• Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments (2013, unknown): “Parco et al. (2005) and Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009) apply the distorted probability function (10), combined with a utility of winning, to explain the pattern of the data observed in their contest experiments.”