Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests
By Roman M. Sheremeta. 2010
120 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Political Science and International Relations, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bfffe3ec03176dec3a4aee9c172e67829e1ff650
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Political Science and International Relations
In Safety Research
- Emmanuel Dechenaux
- Dan Kovenock
- Roman M. Sheremeta
- Timothy N. Cason
- William A. Masters
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury
- Shakun D. Mago
- Anya Samak
In Sociology and Political Science
- Dan Kovenock
- Emmanuel Dechenaux
- Timothy N. Cason
- William A. Masters
- Roman M. Sheremeta
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury
Citations in the corpus
- A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments (2014, methodology): “Interestingly, in a two-stage elimination contest and a related design, Sheremeta (2010a) also finds that the effect of carryover is to increase first-stage effort levels and decrease second-stage effort.”
- SIMULTANEOUS DECISION‐MAKING IN COMPETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENTS (2013, unknown): “candidates spend more than the efficient amount on campaigning ( Sheremeta, 2008 ).”
- Fight or Flight? (2012, unknown): “…(Friedman et al. 2007).17 Several other possible explanations, proposed in the literature, include subjects having a nonmonetary value of winning (Sheremeta 2010a, 2010b; Price and Sheremeta 2011), having spiteful preferences (Herrmann and Orzen 2008) or making mistakes (Potters et al. 1998;…”
- Entry into Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests: An Experimental Study (2010, background): “Similar over-bidding behavior is found in studies of lottery contests (Sheremeta, 2010).”
- Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic versus Psychological Momentum (2012, unknown): “Finally, recent experiments have found evidence that subjects have a non-monetary utility of winning a Tullock contest, and this can partially explain overdissipation of effort (Parco et al., 2005; Sheremeta, 2010b).”
- Facing Your Opponents (2014, unknown): “Nonmonetary utility of winning w is not directly observable, but following Sheremeta (2010b) we elicited it as follows: in a ‘‘surprise’’ additional period at the end of the experiment, all subjects were given an endowment of eighty francs and participated in a lottery contest for a prize valued at…”