Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic versus Psychological Momentum

By Shakun D. Mago, Roman M. Sheremeta, Andrew Yates. 2012

140 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/54b22c9771c106e8c94f50d9e22ca89b90ae78c3

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Emmanuel Dechenaux
2. Dan Kovenock
3. Roman M. Sheremeta
4. Subhasish M. Chowdhury

In General Decision Sciences

1. Dan Kovenock
2. Emmanuel Dechenaux
3. Roman M. Sheremeta
4. Subhasish M. Chowdhury

In Safety Research

1. Emmanuel Dechenaux
2. Dan Kovenock
3. Roman M. Sheremeta
4. Subhasish M. Chowdhury
5. Shakun D. Mago
6. Anya Samak

Citations in the corpus

• A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments (2014, background): “The best-of-three contest examined by Mago et al. (2013) is similar to a race.”
• Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence (2013, unknown): “17 This finding is consistent with several other experimental studies documenting negative correlation between risk-aversion and contest expenditures (Millner and Pratt, 1991; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Sheremeta, 2011; Mago et al., 2013).”
• Facing Your Opponents (2014, unknown): “Similarly, Noussair and Porter (1992) report that English and uniform price sealed bid auctions are more efficient when there is a lack of common information.”